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Introduction
During 2006, the German Public Employment Service ("Bundesagentur fur Arbeit") and the German government spent 18.5 billion Euros on active and 46.8 billions on passive labor market policies (Bundesagentur fur Arbeit 2006). The question, whether the considerable funds devoted to active labor market policies have been used effectively gains more and more attention in Germany. Olaf Hiibler -to whom this volume is dedicatedhas contributed to the early literature, in particular for East Germany (Hiibler 1997 (Hiibler , 1998 . Large evaluation projects have analyzed the effectiveness of public job creation schemes (see for instance Caliendo et al. 2006b Caliendo et al. , 2008a Caliendo et al. , 2008b and further vocational training programs (see for instance Fitzenberger et al. 2006 , Fitzenberger/Vólter 2007 , Lechner et al. 2005 , 2007a . A further step was reached with the comprehensive evaluation of the so called "Hartz" reforms of German labor market policies; this huge evaluation project involved the majority of German socio-economic research institutes and has been supervised by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS). Furthermore, the German Public Employment Service started the TrEffeR-project (Treatment Effects and Prediction) to develop its own evaluation and monitoring tool (Stephan et al. 2006 ). This paper adds to this literature by analyzing empirically a particular aspect -the definition of non-participation arising in evaluation studies that utilize non-experimental data. For participants in five active labor market programs, starting during March 2003, I apply statistical matching techniques to estimate program effects on cumulated days spent in regular employment during the 3V2 years after program entry. I compare the results for a very narrow and a very wide "classification window" defining non-treatment.
In the former case all persons are categorized as non-treated who did not enter a program during March 2003, while they may be "waiting" to participate at a later date. In the latter case the non-treatment group consists of persons who have never been in any program during the entire observation period of 3 V2 years. Additional estimates also include only participants, who did not join any further labor market program during the observation period. This is no minor issue, since typically around 40 to 50 percent of comparison group members and around 50 to 70 percent of those taking-up a program in March 2003 also participated in at least one (further) program starting after March 2003. A similar analysis has been conducted by Steiger (2004) for Switzerland, who did, however, not distinguish between different labor market programs. Her main result was that participation is much more effective compared to "waiting" than compared to "never in any program". A recent example for the possible importance of the topic is provided by three studies of German further vocational training programs, covering program entries from 2000 to 2002: Wunsch and Lechner (2008) estimated that further vocational training -and other programs -had generally negative or insignificant effects on employment probabilities of participants and their cumulated days spent in regular employment 30 months after program start. Small positive effects were found for few subgroups of participants only. This was taken up by a German newspaper claiming that active labor market policy in Germany wastes billions of Euros (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 28, 2007) . Biewen et al. (2007) point out that -also 30 months after program start -they found positive effects of further vocational training with short or medium duration on the employment prospects of certain subgroups in West Germany. Rinne et al (2007) , who investigated entries in further vocational training programs of medium duration during 2002, obtained -two years after program start -even positive effects on employment probabilities for all subgroups investigated.
One of the underlying reasons might be that Wunsch and Lechner (2008) "define participants as unemployed who participate at least once in a program in the 18 months following the inflow date into our sample. Accordingly, non-participants are all persons who do not enter a program during this period." (p. 143). Thus "non-treatment" requires that no treatment has occurred up to a period of 18 months after entry into unemployment. Biewen et al. (2007) perform separate estimates by duration of unemployment at the beginning of a treatment (up to three months, four to six months, seven to twelve months of unemployment) and require only that non-participants have not entered a measure during an accordingly chosen classification window of three or six months. Rinne et al. (2007) stratify estimates by duration of unemployment in months and require that non-participants had not taken-up the same type of training program before and during the quarter of the participant's program entry (p. 10). Sensitivity analysis conducted by these authors (Section 4.4 of their paper) showed also that estimated program effects decreased considerably if they use a similar definition of non-treatment than Wunsch and Lechner (2008) did.
The following Section 2 briefly describes German active labor market policies and recent evaluation results. Section 3 discusses the evaluation problem investigated. Section 4 introduces data, variables and the particular method and evaluation design used. The empirical results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 lists the conclusions.
Active labor market policies in Germany and recent evaluation results
The "Hartz" reforms, enacted in 2002, caused a fundamental revision of active and passive labor market policies in Germany: Since 2003 the design of several active measures was modified and a number of new instruments were introduced. Regarding passive labor market policies, since 2005 former unemployment assistance for long-term unemployed persons and former social assistance has been merged into a new variant of basic social care for needy employable persons.
This section gives a short overview of the main instruments of active labor market policies in Germany. Furthermore, results from selected recent evaluation studies on the effectiveness of active labor market policies in Germany will be sketched. Most of these studies are based on statistical matching techniques, while a few apply duration analysis. Statistical matching techniques compare a group of treated individuals with a selected group of similar, but untreated comparison persons; the estimated program effect is then simply given by the difference in outcome variables -mostly employment rates -between the two groups (see Section 3 for more details). Duration analysis parametrically estimates the effect of treatment on the "risk" of entering employment or leaving unemployment. The increasingly popular timing-of-events model (Abbring/van den Berg 2003 additionally takes into account the risk of entering a program during an unemployment spell. Table 1 shows entries and populations in selected programs of active labor market policies administered by the German Public Employment Service for the period 2000 to 2006. The empirical results presented in section 5 in this paper restrict themselves to short programs up to six months duration and include variants of further vocational training, short-term training measures, wage subsidies and public job creation schemes. For a long time so called "further" vocational training ("Forderung beruflicher Weiterbildung") belonged to the most important programs in Germany. It encompasses a range of different treatments, which can be broadly classified in qualification programs, training within "practice firms" (that offer practical occupational training without trainees actually working in a real company) and long retraining programs. However, during the first half of this decade entries as well as the duration of these measures were shrinking, whereas the number of entries increased again in 2006. The effectiveness of these programs has been analyzed in a considerable number of studies applying statistical matching techniques. Lechner et al. (2005 Lechner et al. ( , 2007a on the employment probabilities of participants in all subgroups investigated. applied duration analysis to East German data from the years 1999 to 2002 -their result was that participation in further vocational training prolonged unemployment duration.
Short-term training programs ("Trainingsmaßnahmen"), whose duration does in most cases not exceed two months, have been increasing in number in particular during 2003 and 2004. These short-term measures are utilized to train qualifications and abilities (firm-internal and firm-external), to test the availability of unemployed persons, to check whether unemployed are suited for further longer-term measures and to provide job search assistance through application training. These short-term measures have been analyzed also in the already cited studies of Biewen et al. (2007) and Wunsch and Lechner (2008) . Similar to further vocational training, Biewen et al. obtained mostly positive, while Wunsch and Lechner found insignificant effects of short training-programs. Hujer et al. (2006a) showed -using duration analysis -that the risk of entering employment is significantly higher for individuals participating in a short-training program. These studies, however, do not take into account the substantial heterogeneity of this class of programs. Wolff and Jozwiak (2007) distinguished between short classroom training and short training within firms for individuals; they investigated the effect on the employment prospects of unemployed receiving means-tested unemployment benefits ("Arbeitslosengeld II"). They obtained the result that both variants have positive effects, which are much larger for short training within firms. These are, however, also much more prone to deadweight losses. Büttner (2007) used data from a social experiment on short-training programs to test the availability of the unemployed. He showed that it is the notification of treatment rather than participation that had an effect on leaving unemployment.
A number of programs foster a direct integration of the unemployed in the first labor market. Of particular importance are a variant of targeted wage subsidies ("Eingliederungszuschüsse"), paid to employers for a fixed period of time. They gained importance first in East Germany following the reunification and thereafter again in the late nineties, but lost importance until 2005, like further vocational training schemes. From 1998 to 2003 three variants were in place: One was characterized by a rather low level of targeting, while one was aimed at hard-to-place unemployed with severe problems of reintegration and one at workers of age 50 and older. The "Hartz" reforms collapsed these into a single wage subsidy for hard-to-place workers, with a looser definition of target groups and less generous financial support. Jaenichen and Stephan (2007) estimated average treatment effects of a subsidy on previously unemployed hard-to-place individuals. In line with the international literature on wage subsidies, they showed that subsidies have a favorable effect on the employment prospects of participants. Boockmann et al. (2007) utilized a "natural experiment": They computed the effect of changes in the legislation on wage subsidies for older workers on the employment prospects of this group, using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare changes in transition probabilities between the affected group and a comparison group comprised of slightly younger workers. The authors found nearly no significant effects and concluded that deadweight effects -those subsidized would have been hired anyway -are a major problem of wage subsidies.
Two programs offering financial support for unemployed persons founding their own businesses grew in numbers until 2006. A first variant ("Überbrückungsgeld") encouraged unemployed persons to start-up a new business by proceeding to pay unemploy-ment benefits as well as a subsidy to social security contributions for six months. The "Hartz" reforms in 2003 additionally introduced a second variant of a start-up subsidy ("Existenzgriindungszuschuss"), which provided a fixed, but time-decreasing amount for up to three years and was attractive for unemployed persons who received comparatively few unemployment benefits. In August 2006 both programs were collapsed in a new variant of a start-up subsidy ("Griindungszuschuss"). Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) analyzed the effect of both previous variants on unemployed persons, who founded a subsidized business in 2003. Their results showed that unemployment rates were lower 28 months after program start and rates of regular employment or self-employment were significantly higher across those subsidized than in an unsubsidized comparison group.
Previously very important programs for job creation in the public sector ("ArbeitsbeschaffungsmaiSnahmen und StrukturanpassungsmaEnahmen") nearly disappeared since 2005. However, since then a new variant of public job creation for long-term unemployed ("Arbeitsgelegenheiten") is the most important program for unemployed persons receiving social basic care. The latter provide mostly only a modest additional reimbursement for work ("Ein-Euro-Jobs"). Caliendo et al. (2006b Caliendo et al. ( , 2008a Caliendo et al. ( , 2008b as well as Hujer and Thomsen (2006c) investigated entries into public job creation schemes in 2000, using the matching method. They estimated heterogeneous effects on participants, which are in the longer-run mostly negative or insignificant. Exceptions are longterm unemployed, highly qualified men and older women in West Germany. Hujer and Zeiss (2006d) evaluated these programs in East Germany schemes also with the timingof-events method. Their main conclusion is that participation in these schemes increased individual unemployment duration of participants. Recent results on the new "OneEuro-Jobs" (Hohmeyer/Wolff 2007) , introduced in 2005, highlighted the effect heterogeneity of this program. The authors found slightly positive effects in particular for participants from West Germany and individuals out of regular employment for a longer time period.
Contracting-out to private placement services gained importance during the last years in Germany. On the one hand unemployed persons may be assigned to private agencies that compete on a quasi-market ("Beauftragung privater Dritter"). On the other hand unemployed persons may ask for a voucher that entitles them to use the services of a private placement agency. Also temporary help firms may employ previous unemployed persons, while receiving financial reimbursement by the Public Employment Service ("PersonalService-Agenturen"). Using statistical matching methods, Winterhager (2008) showed that most subgroups of unemployed persons contracted out to private placement agencies in 2004 did not experience an increase in employment prospects during a period of nine months after treatment start. A number of studies (for instance Lechner et al. 2005 , 2007a , Jaenichen/Stephan 2007 showed that estimated treatment effects of labor market programs are more positive for the outcome variable "regular employment" than for the outcome variable "not unemployed". Both outcome variables may differ since not every person avoiding unemploy- 
c cfl O 8 § ment has to be regularly employed -several persons might withdraw temporarily or permanently from the labor force (another option might for instance be to take up unsubsidized self-employment). The observed difference between both outcome variables results from the fact that a higher share of the comparison group than of the treatment group withdraws from the labor force. Thus one effect of the participation in labor market programs might be to activate individuals who would otherwise have withdrawn from the labor market.
Since the main topic of the paper is the classification window underlying definitions of non-treatment using statistical matching techniques, Overview 1 summarizes selected information on several studies cited above. The "maximum restriction" in the last column shows how long after program start of a treated person its matched comparison person may not be "allowed" to enter a program. It depends first on the time window over which treatments are sampled: If program entry occurs at the beginning of this time window the maximum restriction applies, while the restriction is not binding if a program is taken up at the end of this time window. It depends second on the decision to stratify the sample by duration of unemployment: If the sample is stratified, the restriction occurs only within each strata. Authors applying no stratification typically condition their choice of comparison groups on duration of unemployment.
Note finally that for instance Lechner et al. (2005 Lechner et al. ( ,2007a ) use a rather wide participation window, but assigned for each non-participant a hypothetical starting date, drawn from the distribution of observed starting dates of treatment. To obtain comparable samples of participants and non-participants, all non-participants who were already employed at this date were then excluded from further analysis. However, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007, Footnote 11) criticize this approach for adding additional noise to the data.
The evaluation problem
The majority of micro studies using non-experimental data estimate average treatment effect on the treated (Heckman et al. 1999 ). In our case this implies estimating the average effect of participation in active labor market programs on subsequent days spent in regular employment. I will first sketch the framework and then introduce a classification window for the definition of non-treatment. (
While we observe E(Yi |D = 1), the average outcome of the treated with treatment, we cannot observe the average outcome of the treated without treatment E(Yo|D = 1). Using non-experimental data one thus has to find a comparison group of non-treated individuals to impute the counterfactual outcome of the treated without treatment (Rubin 1974).
One standard approach to this problem applies statistical matching techniques to balance the distribution of individual characteristics between the groups of treated and nontreated individuals. This method -that underlies also the empirical analysis conducted in this paper -requires that all variables X, which determine the decision to join a program and the expected success of a program, are known and available. Conditioning on those variables, the expected outcome under non-treatment should not depend on the decision to join: Yo JLD|X, where JLdenotes independence. If this "Conditional Independence Assumption" (CIA) holds, the ATT may be represented as
where the outer expectation of the second term on the right hand side is taken over the distribution of X in the treated population (see for instance Caliendo/Hujer 2006a). Furthermore, the "Common Support Condition" requires that each treated individual has a positive probability not to be in a program, which guarantees that all of them have a counterpart in the group of non-participants.
The most common approach used in the evaluation of European labor market policies has been suggested by Sianesi (2004 Sianesi ( ,2008 and uses a narrow classification window. The underlying idea is that European labor market programs are ongoing and any unemployed is a potential participant. Individuals will join sooner or later provided they are still eligible. The treatment group consists of all individuals "joining" a program during a chosen time interval. Non-participants are defined as "waiting" in the sense that they do not take up treatment until the beginning of the evaluation period, but eventually at a later date. Frederiksson and Johansson (2004) characterize this as a time-varying treatment indicator. To formalize this, let the ATT be given more specifically as
where t is the timing of treatment and t + h the point of time when the outcome is observed (in this paper t will be March 2003 and h will be 3> l h years). This "joining versus waiting" approach has been adopted for instance in a comprehensive evaluation of recent German labor market reforms (Deutscher Bundestag 2006) . The estimated effects display the advantage of joining at a given time compared to waiting longer and are useful for testing for the existence of a treatment effect (see Frederiksson/Johansson 2004, Proposition 4) . But they do not isolate the effect of a single intervention and are thus not suited for a cost-benefit analysis.
Note that Sianesi (2004) in implementing this approach stratifies her sample by duration of unemployment in months. This approach has also been applied in the already cited studies of Biewen et al. (2007) , Hujer and Thomsen (2006c) and Rinne et al. (2007) . An alternative is to condition the choice of the comparison group on the duration of unemployment up to program entry. This requires, however, computing a "hypothetical" program entry date for potential comparison persons.
An entirely different approach uses an extremely wide classification window for the choice of potential comparison persons and to define non-treatment as no treatment during the entire observation period. The corresponding average treatment effect on the treated has been characterized by Steiger (2004) as "joining versus never in any program" and might be written as
The idea of this approach is to imitate a social experiment, in which randomly chosen participants are assigned to treatment while members of a randomly chosen comparison group will not receive treatment. It has been used for instance by US-studies where a program is administered at fixed point in time and individuals are either treated or not treated. With non-experimental data, however, the timing of program participation in an unemployment spell cannot be assumed to be random. Suppose that people do not enter a program because they expect to find a job soon. This implies that selecting a comparison group of individuals, who never participated in any program, bases selection on expected (successful) future outcomes. Thus matching conditional on observable individual characteristics might not suffice to remove selectivity (Sianesi 2004 (Sianesi , 2008 , Fredriksson/Johansson 2004, Proposition 1).
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, a comparison between the "waiting" and the "never in any program" concepts has been conducted by Steiger (2004) , who analyzed entries in Swiss active labor market programs. She obtained positive effects of most programs compared to non-treatment in the "joining versus waiting" context, but negative effects of almost all programs compared to non-treatment in the "joining versus never in any program" context. There are at least two possible explanations. On the one hand, those who were never in any program may be in fact a positive selection from all individuals. This is the aspect highlighted in the theoretical literature. However, on the other hand they may have the advantage to experience no lock-in effects at all from later participation. In contrast, the treatment group is not only locked-in during participation, but partly also during additional later treatment, if "program careers" evolve. This aspect has rather been neglected in the literature, but might be in particular important if programs are rather long and the observation period is rather short.
Thus, I will also apply a third concept in the following, suggested by the empirical fact that program careers are a non-trivial issue. The underlying idea is that the "joining versus never in any program" applies a restriction only to future outcomes of comparison group members, but not to those of participants. Both problems mentioned above might be partly resolved if we introduce a weaker, but similar restriction also to the group of participants, thus applying the classification window for the definition of non -treatment also to the future of the treatment group. In other words we will estimate the effect of "joining once versus never in any program". Let now s be the duration of the first program, with s < h. Then the effect is given by
While the second approach bases the selection of comparison persons on their (successful) future outcomes, the third concept additionally bases the selection of participants on the fact that they have not participated in a further program during the observation period. The drawbacks are, however, that the analysis is restricted on selected subgroups of individuals and that the approach neglects that program participation itself might induce participation in further programs. Finally, it should be noted that the identifying assump-tion of statistical matching techniques is that no unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the selection into programs and with outcome variables remains after accounting for observable variables. In contrast, duration analysis, in particular the timing-of-events approach (Abbring/van den Berg 2003 , allows also for selection on unobserved characteristics. The drawback is that -in contrast to the non-parametrical statistical matching approach -these models impose the identifying assumption that transition processes into labor market programs as well as across labor market states can be modeled as a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model. An applied comparison between a dynamic matching estimator and the timing-of-events approach has been conducted by Lalive et al. (2008) for Swiss labor market programs.
Data, variables, and applied method
The empirical analysis utilizes the TrEffeR data set (Stephan et al. 2006) , which has been constructed for monitoring purposes of the German Public Employment Service. The current version merges data flows from the distinct computer based operative systems of the Public Employment Service on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment, participation in labor market programs and employment for the period 2000 to 2007. Note that the data of the Public Employment Service are partly incomplete since 2005 as a consequence of the already mentioned last "Hartz" labor market reform, which re-allocated responsibilities for long-term unemployed persons between the Public Employment Service and local municipalities. Data flows from several local municipalities ("Optierende Kommunen") opting out of the co-operation with the Public Employment Service have not been entirely integrated yet. For individuals from these municipalities we cannot distinguish between times of unemployment and programs and other times out of the labor force. However, information on times in regular employment -the outcome variable utilized in this paper -is available also for these persons. The sample analyzed here covers all individuals who were unemployed for up to one year in March 2003 and of age 25 to 59. This selection excludes in particular individuals eligible for specific programs for youth unemployed. All estimates are performed separately for West and East Germany.
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, the treatment groups consist of individuals who took up one of the following labor market programs of short or medium length during March 2003: a) Participation in the most common variant of further vocational training, aimed at the provision of specific professional skills (in the Tables and  Figures abbreviated as "provision of skills"), b) Treatment within a practice firm, another variant of further vocational training that offers practical training without trainees working in a real company, c) Short firm-external classroom training imparting qualifications and abilities, with an average of about IV2 months, d) Short firm-internal training, also imparting qualifications and abilities, with an average duration of about one month, e) A wage subsidy for hard-to-place workers, covering up to 50 percent of the wage and paid to the employers, f) Participation in a public job creation scheme ("Arbeitsbeschaffungsmafinahme", which has been denoted as variant I in Table 1 ). Note that case managers in local employment agencies have latitude in the decision to grant participation in one of these programs. For all programs except the short training programs only treatments with duration of 4 to 6 months are taken into account. The underlying assumption is that a program is not characterized by its type but also by its length. Following the majority of the literature, only the effect of the first treatment during an unemployment spell is analyzed. Performance cluster of the regional labor market (Blien et al. 2004) . Mean values of selected explaining variables can be found in Table Al in the Appendix.
A non-testable assumption underlying the statistical matching technique is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which states that -conditioning on the explaining variables -the expected outcome under treatment and under non-treatment should not differ across treated and comparison persons. The variables available allow controlling for a wide range of individual characteristics, including past experiences with the Public Employment Service. Thus unobserved individual heterogeneity should not be a serious problem for the analysis, since the data include also information on previous employment histories, which should capture most of the effects of unobserved individual factors (Heckman et. al 1999) . However, for wage subsidies as well as short firm-internal training measures also labor demand side factors will influence access to subsidized jobs as well as the probability of further employment. The matching of workers to heterogeneous firms, together with the lack of information on employer characteristics may therefore produce a bias in the estimates because of firm heterogeneity (Jaenichen/Stephan 2007) . Thus results for both programs should be taken with caution.
The applied method is a so called nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score with ties and replacement. A useful simplification of matching on a high-dimensional vector of X-variables is given by propensity-score matching. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that it is sufficient to match on the propensity score Pr(X) = Pr(D = 1|X) to obtain the same probability distribution for treated and non-treated individuals. Thus, if Yo-lLD|X holds, Yo_lLD|Pr(X) will also be satisfied. For treated persons, all non-treated individuals, whose propensity scores have the smallest distance to that of the treated person, are chosen as comparisons. Replacement implies that potential comparison group members can be used as comparisons for more than one treated person. The program impact is estimated as the mean difference in the weighted outcomes of both groups, where a weighting is applied to comparison persons if one treated person has more than one comparison person.
Estimates are performed using the stata-module psmatchl (Leuven/Sianesi 2003) . To test for the quality of matching the mean standardized bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983) between each treated group and its matched comparison group is computed across all variables from X. The standardized bias of a covariate is defined as the difference of means in the treated and matched comparison sample, divided by the square root of the average sample variance. Thus a lower value of the MSB indicates more similarity between the two groups.
Empirical results
Figure 1 summarizes the main results of the analysis -the average treatment effect on the treated on cumulated days spent in regular employment, 3 V2 years after program entry in March 2003. The change of effects over time is displayed in detail in Figure A1 in the Appendix, which shows clearly in particular the lock-in effects arising during program participation.
Additional information can be found in Table 2 , which also shows cumulated days spent in regular employment during the observation period for treated persons (T) and matched comparison persons (C). For instance, if we apply the "joining versus waiting" approach, individuals participating in further vocational training providing skills in West Germany were 483 days of 1260 days in regular employment, while comparable persons not entering a program during March 2003 were employed for 400 days. The estimated treatment effect is significant positive and amounts to 83 days -nearly three months. Furthermore, Table 2 contains the mean standardized bias (MSB) before and after matching as well as the bias reduction through matching.The latter results will not be discussed further, but indicate a rather good quality of the matching.
As can be seen most clearly from Figure 1 , estimated effects differ systematically across programs and slightly across both regions of Germany -and they depend strongly on the classification window chosen. In what follows I will first discuss results by program, starting with the most "positive" programs. Second, results for West and East Germany are compared briefly. Third, the importance of the classification window chosen will be explored in detail. 
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These results regarding the particular programs are so far in line with the literature cited in Section 2. Persistent positive treatment effects are found for hard-to-place individuals who received a wage subsidy. Short firm-internal training programs also exert a significant positive impact on cumulated days of regular employment. However, as has already been mentioned in Section 4, the estimates for both programs may partly suffer from selectivity at the firms' side. For further vocational training providing skills, the estimated treatment effects are -depending on the classification window chosen -either significantly positive or insignificant. For those who receive a treatment within a practice firm, insignificant effects are found. Short classroom training programs has partly positive, partly insignificant and partly negative effects on cumulated days of regular employment -again dependent on the underlying classification window. Finally, estimated treatment effects are insignificant or negative for those working in public job creation schemes.
Most programs investigated perform slightly better for persons treated in East Germany than for participants in West Germany. This is to a huge extent the result of the poor labor market situation in East Germany (especially for women), with generally worse opportunities to leave unemployment for comparison group members compared to West Germany. One noticeable exception is treatment in public job creation schemes, whose effectiveness for the treated is lower in East Germany.
Let us now turn to the main topic of the paper, the relationship between the size of the classification window and estimated program effectiveness. To give an example, comparing participants in further vocational training providing skills in West Germany with a matched group of "waiting" persons, we estimate that treated persons have spent a significant length of time, specifically 83 days or almost 3 months, more in regular employment during the 3V2 years after program start. However, the program effect shrinks to an insignificant 22 days if we compare participants with a group of comparison persons who have never entered any program during the observation period. If, however, we restrict the analysis additionally to treated persons, who took-up no further program during the observation period, the estimated treatment effect increases again -to significantly positive 138 days spent more in regular employment.
The overall picture is similar: Table 2 shows that estimated effects are always lowest and in most cases negative if the classification window encompasses the entire observation period, while no restriction is put on the future of the treatment group ("joining versus never in any program"). In contrast, estimated effects are more positive, when the classification window encompasses only one month and no further restrictions on the future of the treated and the comparison persons are applied ("joining versus waiting"). Why does the "never in any program" comparison group perform better in the market than the "waiting" comparison group? First, as has been already discussed in Section 3, Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2004) argue that the former are a selected group of unemployed who did not enter a program because they did expect to find a job soon anyway. Also caseworkers might find that these persons are not in need of participation. Hence the decision to participate may be the result of an adverse selection process, and future unemployment prospects partly explain the decision to participate during the observation period. This would imply that the Conditional Independence Assumption might not hold. Second, participation in active labor market programs is in most cases associated with a significant lock-in-effect due to reduced search activity. In the "waiting" context the treatment group would then be compared with a comparison group that partly experiences lock-in effects from treatment also -only later. The later during the observation period the entry into a program occurs, the lower is the probability that positive program effects will outweigh these lock-in effects. The "never in any program" group has ex post avoided such lock-in effects. This argument will hold even if ex ante no unobserved heterogeneity is present.
Both effects cannot be disentangled empirically. Both raise, however, the question, how many of those "waiting" do in fact enter a program later during the observation period. Also individuals entering a program in March 2003 may enter another program during this period. That in particular short programs are often followed by further program participation has already been shown by Wunsch and Lechner (2008) , who described further program participation of participants and non-participants in their sample. Table 3 shows for treated and comparison persons, which share of each group enters further treatment during the 3V2 years after program start (as has been depicted in Section 4, these shares might be even slightly underestimated). The results show clearly that both treatment effects discussed so far for those "joining" a program do not isolate the effect of a single intervention. If we restrict the sample to treated individuals who joined a program only once (in March 2003) and to potential comparison persons who never entered any program during the observation period, we obtain the third treatment effect displayed in Table 1 ("joining once versus never in any program"). Estimated treatment effects are typically highest if this wide classification window for the definition of non-treatment as well as for the identification of an "isolated" treatment is used. This effect is not distorted by further interventions for treated as well as for comparison persons and makes both groups investigated more similar. However, now also the treatment group will consist of a selected group of individuals, who did expect or were expected by caseworkers to find a job without entering a further program.
All estimates have been replicated also for the outcome variable "cumulated days not in unemployment and not in a labor market program", restricting the analysis on the group of individuals from local labor markets without a municipality opting out of the cooperation with the Public Employment Service (see section 4). Even though estimated treatment effects are smaller than those found for the outcome variable "cumulated days in regular employment", as is often the case (see section 2), the results show exactly the same pattern: Estimated treatment effects depend strongly on the classification window chosen for the definition of non-treatment, with more positive results for a small than for a wide classification window.
Conclusions
The decision for a classification window that defines treatment and non-treatment is a crucial issue in evaluation studies of active labor market programs. Whereas a social experiment allows for a random assignment of individuals to treatment and control group, a major challenge of observation studies is to control for selection mechanisms. A broader classification window might easily introduce selection on future expected outcomes of participants. This paper estimated the program effects for participants in different German labor market programs empirically, applying one very small (one month) and one very wide (3V2 years) classification window.
Since results are sensitive to the choice of the classification window, a main conclusion of the paper is that researchers should be careful in interpreting the results of evaluation studies of active labor market programs using statistical matching techniques: The meaning of estimated treatment effects as well as the size of estimated effects hinge strongly on the choice of treatment and comparison group. This is in particularly obvious for training programs. These programs have been shown to have typically rather weak effects. Thus the design of the study could make the difference between obtaining significant positive, insignificant or negative effects. Thus authors of evaluation studies should spend some effort to describe their classification window chosen very clearly and to discuss the implications of this aspect of their evaluation design.
The paper demonstrates also that none of the approaches applied here is appropriate to isolate the effect of a certain program and at the same time to avoid selectivity: The "joining versus waiting" design has become more and more common in the evaluation of active labor market policies in Europe. Its drawback is that it cannot be used to isolate the effects of a single intervention, which also prevents a clear analysis of efficiency of the program -members of the treatment as well of the comparison group may enter other programs later, which might induce further costs. In contrast, the "joining versus never in any program" design, which compares treated persons with those entering no program at all during the observation period, might be prone to unobserved heterogeneity on the side of the comparison group. Finally, the "joining once versus never in any program" design introduces a similar restraint for program participants. Thus unobserved selectivity will be partly removed across treatment and comparison groups investigated -but estimates are not valid for the entire number of program participants. A further result of the paper is that program careers are an important and still underresearched issue. For most programs investigated here, the majority of participants enter at least one further program during the 3V2 years after taking-up a program in March 2003. Several recent papers deal with dynamic treatment assignment (Adda et al. 2006 , Lechner 2004 , Lechner/Wiehler 2007b , the literature in this field is, however, still sparse. Tables   m  O  O 
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Appendix: Additional Figures and
